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Abstract 
This article examines the role of the news media through a case study of the narratives about 
the 2014 Ukraine crisis in three major Norwegian newspapers. The conflict also contained a 
‘war’ between competing strategic narratives from the involved actors, with a potential for 
cross-national cascades into the Norwegian narrative. The authors’ focus is on the framing of 
Russia during the most dramatic month of March 2014. They applied the images related to 
Wendt’s cultures of anarchy (Wendt, 1999) to classify the framing of Russia. The Norwegian 
media narrative was relatively consistent in framing Russia as choosing a path leading away 
from being a rival of Norway and the West, towards becoming their enemy. This was close to 
the narrative of the Norwegian government and in clear opposition to the Russian narrative. 
While this supports Hoskins and O’Loughlin’s ‘arrested war’ hypothesis (2015), it also raises 
questions about professional media norms.  
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Introduction 
Despite hopes to the contrary, international politics and foreign policy have become more 
complex and unstable after the Cold War. This makes it challenging to comprehend for the 
news media, especially during times of rapidly emerging crises, which may jeopardise national 
security.  Furthermore, scholarly debate diverges regarding the media’s autonomy and ability 
to influence foreign policy (Chomsky and Herman, 2008; Entman, 2003; Hallin, 1986; Oates, 
2008: 6; Robinson, 1999). Another complication is that after the turn of the millennium 
independent and non-state actors took advantage of the new media ecology and its 
affordances. This undermined the previous dominance of mainstream "broadcast" media. In 
international relations, Hoskins & O'Loughlin introduced "diffused war" to conceptualise the 
new reality of mediatized conflicts where authorities and established big media seemed 
unable to maintain control over the narratives (Hoskins and O’Loughlin, 2010). More recently, 
they have suggested mainstream media and authorities now have adapted to the challenges 
of new media technology. They have learned to use the technology for their own ends, “re-
asserting" at least some of their previous control over conflict narratives (Hoskins and 
O’Loughlin, 2015). They conceptualise this as the phase of "arrested war".   
 
In Russia, the authorities implemented full media control as early as from 1999 and the 
Second Chechen War (Oates, 2008: 126-127; Wilhelmsen, 2014). Nevertheless, the 2014 
conflict in Ukraine was a turning point in terms of focus on mediation in international 
relations, not least because of the aggressive Russian media strategy to gain international 
legitimacy for its actions against a sovereign state seeking to align itself with the West.  
"Information war", in tandem with covert war operations on the ground, was an important 
element in Russia's "hybrid war" on Ukraine (Galeotti, 2015). The Russian state used its own 
"arrested" media ecology to frame its operations. The strategic narrative conveyed through 
its media represented an additional line of defence against alleged encirclement from 
increasingly aggressive Western rival states.  
 
In the subsequent period, there has been considerable academic focus on the Russian media 
strategy and presentation of the conflict. As far as we know of, the number of academic 
studies of the conflict's representation in Western mass media, including whether the 
strategic narrative in Russian "information war" cascaded into this representation, is 
significantly lower. Ojala and colleagues studied the visual framing in four major West-
European newspapers (Ojala et al., 2017). They found that Western news media mostly used 
visual imagery and captions to construct narratives of the conflict that portrayed 
Ukraine/Ukrainians as victims and Russia/Putin as villains. Boyd-Barrett's in-depth study of a 
broader selection of Western mainstream media draws similar conclusions (Boyd-Barrett, 
2016).  
 
This paper presents a case study focusing on how Norwegian mainstream mass media framed 
Russia during the critical events in Ukraine. The analytical framework for the first, descriptive 
research question (RQ1) is Wendt’s three images of "enemy", "rival" and "friend" (Wendt, 
1999). It also summarises the strategic narratives told by the Russian and American side, to 
detect whether these narratives cascaded into the Norwegian news media. The central 
section of the paper then analyses front pages and articles from the three most widely read 
Norwegian newspapers (Aftenposten, Dagbladet and VG) during March 2014, the most 
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critical month of the conflict. Our second research question (RQ2) enquires whether the 
newspapers’ representation of the evolving events corresponds to the "arrested war"-
hypothesis and whether this could represent a violation against the ethical norms of 
journalistic professionalism.  
Perceptions of a Russia in transition 
During the Cold War, the High North was one of Europe's most tense and militarised regions 
(Åtland et al., 2005). The Norwegian mass media mirrored the security situation (Karlsen, 
2017). The first phase of the post-Cold War era prompted optimism about integrating Russia 
into the West (Neumann, 2017; Wilhelmsen and Gjerde, 2018). When failed reforms 
contributed to chaos and economic crisis, Norwegian authorities no longer regarded Russia 
as capable of being a threat (Åtland et al., 2005). They remained optimistic about establishing 
a mutually beneficial relationship, including security cooperation through NATO well into the 
2000s (NATO, 2018).  
 
The cooperative relationship in the High North continued to be developed after Putin's 
takeover as president at the turn of the millennium (Wilhelmsen and Gjerde, 2018). But Russia 
also gradually asserted its identity as in opposition to a hegemonic West (Åtland et al., 2005; 
Heier and Kjølberg, 2015).  A period of renewed optimism came with Medvedev's period as 
president 2008-12 and the "reset" of relations with the West in 2009. In 2011 The Norwegian 
Intelligence Service's annual public assessment characterised the bilateral relationship as 
"stable" and cooperation as "well established", "positive and close" (Etterretningstjenesten, 
2011). Russia was not a military threat to Norway. All conflicts were managed within "a well-
established political framework".   
 
This changed after Putin returned as president in May 2012. The 2014 assessment, published 
before the Ukraine intervention, toned down the positive characterisations. It identified a 
more nationalist and ambitious Russian leadership, in the Arctic North and in the post-Soviet 
space (Etterretningstjenesten, 2014). Russia’s rapid military modernisation in the North was 
noted, but not considered representing a threat to Norway.    
 
The Ukraine crisis was the critical juncture where perceptions of Russia, in Norway and 
generally, definitely took a different path. In December 2013, Ukrainian President Yanukovych 
ended negotiations with the EU in favour of a gas agreement with Russia. Protests escalated 
to a violent conflict between pro-Western and pro-Russian groups. Yanukovych fled to Russia 
and pro-Western protesters formed a provisional government in late February 2014. This 
triggered further riots and local insurgencies from pro-Russian separatists. In March 2014, 
Russia intervened with a covert military operation in Eastern Ukraine and on the Crimean 
Peninsula. A controversial referendum on Crimea provided an apparently near-unanimous 
popular mandate for secession from Ukraine and reunification with Russia. Russia and the 
new Crimean authorities concluded the agreement about formal incorporation later the same 
month. Most of the outside world regarded this as an illegal annexation. The EU and the 
member states of NATO promptly implemented economic sanctions against Russia. The right 
of centre, minority coalition of the Conservative party and the Progress party that had 
governed Norway since October 2013 quickly joined the condemnations and sanctions from 
its Western partners.  
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Cultures of anarchy and images of other states  
The Russian intervention in Ukraine appeared to be a surprise to Western leaders, experts 
and media (Dilanian, 2014; Everett and Gerstein, 2014; Maliniak et al., 2014; Voeten, 2014). 
In a short span of time, they had to make sense of what was happening, why it happened and 
the appropriate reactions. Even according to the "rational" world of realist scholars, states 
have to interpret and may misunderstand each other's actions and intentions. A state may 
seek "adjustment" of power or to "maintain its preponderant position in certain regions" 
(Morgenthau, 2006: 27). However, other states can misconceive such policies as "a stepping 
stone to world conquest".   
 
In periods of international disruption, the perspectives offered by "social constructivism" are 
better equipped to analyse these aspects of interpretation and representation. Its primary 
concern is that human actors, as individuals or collectives, have to make sense of their 
identities and the world to guide their actions. As captured by Wendt's much quoted "Anarchy 
is what states make of it" (Wendt, 1992), states may operate within the structure of 
international anarchy. But international anarchy is "an empty vessel" that has to be filled with 
meaning (Wendt, 1999: 6). Its social structure is based on the actors' shared ideas of self and 
the other, and consequently how this influences states' behaviour towards each other.  
 
Wendt suggests three broad categories of states' mutual perception of each other, either as 
"enemy", "rival" or "friend". When these perceptions add up to widely shared ideas among a 
sufficient number of states, they form cultures of anarchy, conceptualised as either of a  
"Hobbesian", "Lockean" or "Kantian" ideal type. Individual states' adherence to their rules of 
behaviour may be a consequence of external force from others, a trade-off ("price") or of the 
state internalising the norms as its own. Deeply internalised and widely shared ideas form a 
cultural structure likely to affect the perceptions and behaviours of states. Such cultures may 
be restricted in space and time or incorporate the whole system over protracted periods. In 
the next section, we discuss how internal norms of the national news media may contribute 
to the discourse on states’ perceptions of themselves and their relations to other states. 
 
News media norms 
National news media convey narratives of events and images of actors in a state's 
international environment to national publics. Framing refers to the processes that shape 
these narratives and images (Entman, 1993: 52). Besides newsworthiness, different 
professional norms guide the media's choices of framing. The most celebrated in the Western 
press is that of the news media as an independent "fourth estate", acting on behalf of the 
citizens through critical and thorough investigation. The Code of Ethics of the Norwegian Press 
("Vær varsom-plakaten"), adopted and upheld by the Norwegian Press Association, states in 
Section 1. The Role of the Press in Society:  
 
A free, independent press is among the most important institutions in a democratic society ... The press 
has important functions in that it carries information, debates and critical comments on current affairs. 
The press is particularly responsible for allowing different views to be expressed... It cannot yield to any 
pressure from anybody who might want to prevent open debates, the free flow of information and free 
access to sources.  (The Norwegian Press Association, 2015) 
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There is nothing elsewhere in the Code of Ethics to indicate that the statement excludes the 
representation of international conflicts. Therefore, the Norwegian press has taken on a social 
responsibility to convey debates and the voices of those involved. However, we also 
understand the norm to encourage independent analysis and conclusions, which may end up 
with attribution of responsibility for the cause or treatment of the conflict. 
 
The tradition of peace journalism represents the second set of internal norms (Colbert, 2009; 
Keeble et al., 2010; Nohrstedt and Ottosen, 2015). According to this tradition, journalists 
should prioritise non-violent responses, avoid taking sides as far as possible and nuance the 
framing of the parties into more than just two opposing (black and white) sides. They should 
map out common ground and potential for dialogue (Lynch and McGoldrick, 2005). Hence, 
this is an ethic calling for journalists to defuse violent conflicts by attributing responsibility to 
both conflicting parties, as well as third parties. 
 
Regarding national matters of foreign policy and involvement in conflicts, there is also a 
competing third set of patriotic norms. The press may feel called upon to prioritise 
considerations of national security, even at the expense of transparency and criticism. Hallin 
called this "the ethic of responsibility", implying a change from the role of "fourth estate" to 
acting as a "fourth branch of government" (Hallin, 1986: 8). From the perspective of this set 
of norms, attribution of causal responsibility will be on "the other" outside one's own culture 
of anarchy. Rune Ottosen and colleagues claim there is a long tradition in Norway of close 
collaboration between mainstream media and authorities in matters of national security, 
combined with a strong emphasis on political consensus and continuity (Ottosen, 2001, 2018). 
This has kept any critical security debate off the Norwegian public agenda from the start of 
the Cold War and up to the present time. 
 
Strategic narratives and media control 
States seek to deploy their self-images, images of others and the international system as a 
whole, to legitimate certain actions and policies as necessary. These images form "strategic 
narratives" (Miskimmon et al., 2018b; Miskimmon and O’Loughlin, 2017). Success in building 
a globally shared narrative that triumph over the narratives of other states is obviously an 
instrument of power. Titling their book "Forging the World", Miskimmon and colleagues 
(Miskimmon et al., 2018a) not only suggested such a capability to use the media to shape the 
world, but also deliberately lying or concealing for that purpose.  
 
Seen as an extension of Entman's cascading activation model, a successful strategic narrative 
will cascade into other states (Entman, 2003). As shown by the arrows in Figure 1 below, our 
approach adds competing cross-national cascades of strategic narratives, on top of national 
cascades. While this paper focuses upon the Norwegian mass media, it is necessary to detect 
influences from other states in its narrative about Ukraine and Russia. Actual effects on the 
national public (the third tier in the model) are not included in our analysis but should be 
included in future research. However, we provide a brief discussion at the end of the paper 
on changes in the public perception of Russia.  
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Figure 1. National and cross-national cascades of strategic narratives 
 
Successful media management therefore entails the penetration of the media systems of 
other states, as well as resisting the attempts of other states to do the same. As indicated, 
cross-national narratives may contain lies and cascade through concealment. "Sharp power" 
refers to how less attractive, authoritarian states like China and Russia can exploit the 
affordances of the global media ecology to hurt democratic rivals through penetration of their 
more open media systems, to create confusion and division (Walker and Ludwig, 2017).  
 
Hoskins & O’Loughlin’s concepts of “diffused” and “arrested war” can be helpful to address 
how democratic states may be comparatively disadvantaged, as they are more vulnerable to 
penetration than authoritarian states.  “Diffused war” capture that the new media ecology 
which grew out of the expansion of the Internet, cheap digital technology and non-Western 
global satellite TV, challenged the dominance of established mainstream big media in the post 
9/11 era (Hoskins and O’Loughlin, 2010, 2015). However, by introducing “arrested war” they 
suggest that mainstream media and authorities gradually learnt to deal with the new media 
technology and have "re-asserted" some of their previous control (Hoskins and O’Loughlin, 
2015; O’Loughlin and Hoskins, 2015).  
 
According to the “sharp power”argument of Walker & Ludwig, we shall not take for granted 
that this excludes the possibility that the struggle between strategic state narratives about 
war and conflict can turn asymmetrical. Western democratic states may be more vulnerable 
and less able to "arrest the war" than authoritarian states like Russia. The latter may turn a 
conflict like the Ukrainian conflict into a “diffused war” for their rivals or enemies, through 
open or concealed penetration of their media systems. 
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Research questions and methodology 
This study explores the framing of Russia in the Norwegian mainstream mass media during 
the Ukraine crisis and discusses the applicability of the arrested war thesis in light of this case. 
The two primary research questions are specified below, before we go on to describe the 
selection of data. 
 
RQ 1: Which Wendtian images did the news media use to frame Russia? 
This first research question is descriptive and asks which of the three Wendtian images the 
news media applied to frame Russia. We outline each of these images below and explain how 
they will be applied to the sample of news items. 
 
The Hobbesian culture represents the image of other states being "threatening adversaries 
who observe no limits in their violence toward each Other" (Wendt, 1999: 258). "The other" 
does not recognise "us" as an autonomous actor. They might, therefore, use violent power 
against "us" when it is in their favour (Wendt, 1999: 260). Hence, for a negative discourse to 
qualify for framing of Russia as an enemy of a state, the discourse must present Russia as a 
military threat to national sovereignty. This is what Wendt dubs "deep revisionism".  
 
The Lockean culture rests on the image of other states as rivals. States might use limited or 
restrained violence to serve their interests, but recognise the sovereignty of each other 
(Wendt, 1999: 279). However, this is still a matter of perception. Other states may perceive 
and frame Russia's objectives as the "deep revisionist" intentions of an "enemy" state. 
Alternatively, the Ukrainian conflict might be an instance of temporary rivalry and "shallow 
revisionism" between two states outside the Kantian culture, with limited implications for 
Norway and the West. Or it may work as rivalry by proxy, between Russia and the West. Still, 
the framing of Russia's intentions and behaviour only fit the Lockean rival image if it also 
attributes the blame for the conflict to other parties than Russia.  
 
The image of friendship between states is the basis of the Kantian culture of anarchy. States 
follow established norms to resolve conflicts peacefully. But they are ready to fight as a team 
to protect the security of other states within the culture if outsiders attack them (Wendt, 
1999: 298). They form a community, rather than just an alliance based on temporal security 
interests. Hence, to qualify for the image of a "friend", other states must frame Russia as a 
state that would refrain from attacking states within the Kantian community and support 
other states in this community, if attacked. Russian intentions in the Ukrainian crisis might 
then even be framed as "friendly" if recognised to be within international law. The United 
Nations can accept outside intervention as invited assistance to defend legitimate national 
authorities or to protect human rights and security.  
 
Application of these three images raises some methodological challenges. The first is that 
framing of Russia involves more than the dyadic relation between Ukraine and Russia. 
Relations between other pairs of states, including Ukraine-Norway and Russia-Norway, as 
well as constellations of states, such as NATO or the EU are significant for perception and 
subsequent framing. When states identify with different cultures, any given state might 
perceive relations within a specific dyad differently. For example, if Norway identifies with 
the Kantian Western culture an attack on a state perceived as part of this culture will 
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represent an attack on a "friend" from an "enemy" outside this culture. If Norway considers 
Ukraine as outside the Kantian culture, the news media might frame Russia as an enemy of 
Ukraine. But still only as a rival of Norway or the West. Consequently, we treated the framing 
of Russia as a matter of degree, opening for hybrid categories, such as "enemy/rival" in the 
latter case. To qualify as a full "enemy", the framing of Russia had to be framed as an enemy 
of both Ukraine and Norway or the West.   
 
A second methodological challenge is that individual stories and front pages might contain an 
indistinct or inconsistent discourse on Russia in graphics, titles and text. Such ambiguities 
might also lead to discrepant interpretations among readers. To address this, both authors 
conducted separate classifications to control for intersubjectivity and identify such 
ambiguities. We found it appropriate to use the hybrid image categories, in cases identified 
as ambiguous by both authors, as well as in the cases of ambiguity revealed by disagreement 
in the classification of image. 
 
RQ 2: Did the Norwegian mass media "arrest the war"? 
Our second research question is explanatory and enquires whether the mass media had 
reasserted at least some of its authoritative role. The mass media had to interpret and 
represent a conflict appearing out of nowhere, accompanied by a huge and dissonant stream 
of information and disinformation. Russia might have arrested the war. But the successful 
application of "sharp power" – or concealment and lies – from the Russian side would turn 
the situation for its adversarial others into a "diffused war"-scenario. For the Norwegian mass 
media to have reasserted its authoritative role, we would expect an independent and 
consistent framing of the conflict in Ukraine. Hence, it is necessary to identify the main 
contents of the Russian strategic narrative to detect whether this cascaded into the 
Norwegian media’s narrative. That said; we are aware of the limitation that strong correlation 
between narratives does not necessarily imply causation. Journalists might still have 
constructed the narratives independently without being influenced by other states. Influence 
is, therefore, a sufficient but not necessary condition. Hence, only a negative correlation 
between the Norwegian news narrative and the Russian narrative is evidence of little Russian 
influence. 
 
We also need to address another aspect of ambiguity in the re-assertion hypothesis if both 
the state and the mainstream media have "arrested" the war. Assuming that the renewed 
mainstream media have reasserted its role; can we expect them to act independently on the 
"fourth estate" norms of professional journalism or even peace journalism? Or will they 
collaborate as part of the state's media management strategy, which can be compatible with 
patriotic norms?   So, we also need to detect the main contents of the official narratives from 
the Norwegian government and its allies and compare it with the media’s narrative.  
 
The professional norms established in the "Code of Ethics" corresponds to a thorough and 
critical analysis, besides the representation of different viewpoints on the crisis. This adds up 
to an expectation of some variations in the images of Russia. Peace journalism leads us to the 
expectation of the newspapers averting one-sided attribution of blame and emphasising 
attribution of responsibility to deal with the crisis to all parties, including the international 
society. Following that norm, we expect the rival image to dominate. The norm of national 
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responsibility leads us to expect the re-presentation will avoid attribution of blame to the 
Norwegian authorities or its allies. The enemy image will dominate the presentation of Russia. 
Selection of data 
We examined the framing of Russia and the Ukrainian crisis in March 2014 in the three 
principal national dailies in Norway. Aftenposten, Dagbladet and VG each reached an 
estimated readership of 1.3-2.4 million in the first quarter of 2014 through their publishing 
platforms (print, net and mobile). The newspapers' stories about Ukraine, therefore, had the 
potential to reach a substantial portion of the 3.6 million persons registered as Norwegian 
voters in 2013.   
 
Table 1. Estimated number of daily readers first quarter of 2014 
 
 Estimated readers (in thousands) 
Newspaper Print edition On all platforms 
Aftenposten 658 1301 
Dagbladet 319 1545 
VG 631 2398 
   
Source: TNS Gallup (http://hjem.tns-gallup.no/magatab/)  
 
All three are in tabloid format and based in Oslo, but distinct in style. Although leaning to the 
non-socialist side, none of them officially supports individual political parties (Herbjørnsrud, 
2017). Ideologically, Dagbladet tends to have the most liberal profile while VG tends to be the 
most conservative. VG and Dagbladet are also more tabloid – or “boulevard” - in style. As 
their daily circulation is based on sales over the counter, they are more dependent on 
sensational news that attracts attention than Aftenposten, which is subscription based.  
 
Our data corpus is the daily print versions of the three papers. Although print has been in 
decline circulation wise, it presents the most significant material that reappears on the other 
platforms. Moreover, the linear browsing inherent in the paper format reduces selective 
exposure and increases the likelihood of the stories on Ukraine being discovered and read 
thoroughly (Thurman, 2017). We reviewed all 93 front pages of that month and 516 
potentially relevant news stories identified through a search on the Norwegian news indexing 
service Retriever (retriever.no). The search included the Norwegian equivalent of "Russia" 
(Russland), but excluded articles also containing "Sotsji" (Sotchi), the host of the Olympic 
Winter Games in February 2014. We identified 35 front pages and 233 articles that 
commented upon the crisis. These were included in the contents analysis, along with 
accompanying visual elements, such as photographs, cartoons and symbols. The latter add 
immediate and considerable suggestive power to the framing (Ojala et al., 2017; Ottosen, 
2007).   
 
For the second research question, we drew sources of presentation from the US and Russia 
into the analysis, to get an indication of whether the Russian and American strategic 
narratives cascaded across state lines into the Norwegian news narrative. We selected public 
statements from the Russian and American leadership made in major speeches by President 
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Putin to the State Duma on 18 March (Putin,  2014) and President Obama in Brussels on 26 
March 26 (Obama, 2014).   
 
We also added the online version of RT International (formerly Russia Today), which is the 
major English-language news source from Russia. A Google search of the RT International web 
site on 25 May 2018, with "ukraine https://'newspaperurl’” as search term identified 202 
relevant articles in March 2014. Compared with the speeches of Putin and Obama, these data 
give an indication of cascading effects within Russia. They also provide for a basic comparison 
with the narratives in the Norwegian press, to indicate Russian influence.  
 
Finally, we included data to address the state – media ambiguity in the “arrested war” 
hypothesis. Our primary source for the state narrative is Foreign Minister Brende’s Annual 
Statement on foreign policy to the Norwegian Parliament on 25 March, and the subsequent 
Parliamentary debate (Brende, 2014b; Stortinget, 2014). While this cannot be an analysis of 
the actual processes of cascading activation, it can detect whether the reporting in the three 
dailies criticised or deviated from the narrative of Norwegian authorities.  
State narratives about the Ukraine conflict 
Table 2 summarises President Putin's and President Obama’s narratives and the Norwegian 
narrative delivered by the Foreign Minister. Hence, the table represents the top tier from 
Figure 1. National and international strategic narratives. The summary uses the narrative 
categories of state self-images, images of others and the international system as a whole, 
which states deploy to legitimate actions and policies (Miskimmon et al., 2018b; Miskimmon 
and O’Loughlin, 2017). These actions and policies mentioned by the leaders are located at the 
bottom of the table. 
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Table 2. Summary of state narratives 
 
 Russia / Putin Norway / Brende USA / Obama 
Self-image Russia’s glorious past 
disrupted by communism.  
Russian soil and nation 
disintegrated by Crimea 
“gifted” to Ukraine and 
dissolution of USSR. 
As a small state Norway 
especially dependent on 
defending a liberal 
international order and on 
the solidarity of NATO allies.   
The USA and the West 
stand for and defend 
universal liberal ideals. 
Images of 
others 
Aggressive and hypocritical 
West encircling Russia, led 
by EU and the USA.  
Ukraine as an arena for 
Western geopolitical 
aggression in the near 
abroad. 
Usually a peaceful and 
mutually beneficial 
relationship with Russia. 
Bolstered by power through 
NATO. Ukraine crisis a new, 
unfortunate phase with 
breaches of international 
law. 
The world had "an 
interest in a strong and 
responsible Russia". But 
it violated international 
law in Ukraine and 
disrupted the ideals of 
the liberal world order.  
 Ukraine led by coup-
makers and radical 
nationalists, prompting 
Russian speakers to self-
defence and calls for 
protection. 
No independent reports of 
systematic violence against 
ethnic Russian minority.  
However, Ukrainian 
authorities had made some 
mistakes. 
New government result 
of the people "reaching" 
liberal ideals. No 
evidence of systematic 
violence against ethnic 
Russians. No Western 
intervention or interest in 
"controlling Ukraine". 
Image of the 
International 
system 
End of global power 
balance after the Cold 
War. West set aside 
international norms as 
they please. Double 
standards and “rule by the 
gun”.  
A global order based on 
international law, 
sovereignty, democracy, 
and free trade. 
Universal liberal ideals 
won through attraction, 
not force. International 
cooperation between 
sovereign states serves 
mutual interests. 
Policies Legitimate humanitarian 
intervention to protect 
civilians. Democratic 
referendum for justified 
Crimean return to Russia.  
Defend international 
order. 
Fully agree with partners in 
EU and NATO on the 
sanctions against Russia. But 
also maintain bilateral 
cooperation, contacts and 
predictable relations. 
Russia will be contained 
through sanctions and 
reinforced NATO military 
presence. 
 
The table identifies a struggle between two incompatible narratives. The Norwegian state 
narrative, as it appeared in Brende’s speech and other official statements (Brende, 2014a, 
2014b; Søreide, 2014; Utenriksdepartementet, 2014a, 2014b), was close to the American and 
also incompatible with the Russian narrative. Furthermore, the subsequent Parliamentary 
debate 2014 confirmed that the well-established values of inter-party consensus and stability 
on foreign policy also applied to the Ukraine crisis (Stortinget, 2014). The representatives of 
all seven parties, including the opposition parties, supported the government's views and 
actions. The Norwegian state narrative about Russia had gradually become more critical after 
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Putin’s return to the presidency, and especially with the new right of center government. But 
Brende’s’ statement and the unison parliamentary support signified what Wilhelmsen and 
Gjerde have described as a “tectonic shift” (Wilhelmsen and Gjerde, 2018: 391).  
 
RT International is a global media network funded by the Russian state, offering global news 
with a “Russian view”, in several languages, via cable TV, its websites and YouTube channels 
(Hutchings et al., 2015; Reisinger and Golts, 2014; Yablokov, 2015). According to President 
Putin, the government intended RT to “break the Anglo-Saxon monopoly on the global 
information streams” and expected it to “reflect the Russian government's official position" 
(RT International, 2013).  Amid the Ukraine crisis, RT's editor-in-chief confirmed that she 
“supported her country” and “considered Russia's position to be right” (Simonyan, 2014). 
Hence, the network openly adhered to the patriotic norms, defining itself along with the role 
of "the fourth branch of government". Our analysis of the articles on RT International’s 
website found that their framing of the conflict in Ukraine was strikingly similar to the 
narrative of President Putin. This corresponds well with other observations of the network 
(Hutchings et al., 2015; Østevik, 2017).  
 
Hence, the Russian state had “arrested the war” and used the RT International to spread its 
strategic narrative and achieve legitimacy for its actions among an international audience.  As 
for its potential impact, the network claims to have built a significant global audience on its 
various platforms (RT International, n.d.). While their own figures are considered being 
inflated, especially for TV (Zavadski, 2015), there were worries about its impact (Applebaum, 
2014). The Norwegian government was also concerned (Brende, 2014a), even confronting a 
major regional newspaper for publishing an Op-ed (Nistad, 2014) that was “merely repeating 
Russian propaganda” (Skjøtskift, 2014).   
 
The representation in the Norwegian mainstream press 
Russia on the newspapers' front pages 
Front pages catch attention and convey messages in an instant to both readers and those 
passing by newspaper stands, through visual imagery and large titles.  They push and frame 
political issues on to the public agenda. Figure 2 below summarises the presentation of the 
Ukraine conflict on the front pages of the three Norwegian newspapers in March 2014.  
 
The conflict appeared on more than a third (35 of 93) of the daily front pages during that 
period. But there were substantial variations between them. The two boulevard papers were 
much less preoccupied with the conflict and more focused on sensational domestic issues, 
besides catering to lifestyle issues and the weather. Aftenposten had almost two-thirds (21) 
of the front pages. We also calculated the percentage of space on total daily front pages 
dedicated to the conflict. The pattern of variation between the newspapers was similar. 
Aftenposten's dedication of space (11.4%) was twice as high as that of the boulevard 
newspapers.   
 
Our independent assessments concluded that almost all of the conveyed images of Russia 
contained in the front-page items were in the "enemy" category or bordering between 
"enemy" and "rival". Only three fitted clearly into the "rival image" and none into the "friend 
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image". Dagbladet appears as most oriented towards the "enemy image", with the two 
others, and especially VG, as somewhat milder. Also, Aftenposten and in particular Dagbladet 
dedicated relatively more space to the most explicit enemy images. These results indicate a 
match between liberalism and hostility towards Putin’s Russia. Still, as Aftenposten dedicated 
more front-page space to the conflict than the others did, it contributed most to framing 
Russia negatively during the whole month.   
 
 
 
Figure 2. Images of Russia on front pages in March 2014 
 
Treating the image of Russia as a continuous variable, ranging from 1 ("Friend") to 3 ("Enemy") 
and including the hybrid categories allows us to calculate the central tendency as an 
arithmetical mean and use standard deviation as a measure of dispersion. It also allows us to 
use the mean in the few cases of disagreement between coders. The arithmetical means 
confirm that Dagbladet (x=2.81) was more "hawkish" than Aftenposten (x=2.71) and 
especially VG (x=2.54). Furthermore, the standard deviations show that Dagbladet (s = 0.19) 
provided a less varied image than Aftenposten (s = 0.31) and VG (s = 0.33). 
 
There is no space for commenting on each individual front-page item. But we shall provide a 
few examples to illustrate. The front page from Dagbladet 2 March  framed Russia as an 
"enemy", personified through a close-up of an aggressive Putin. Its headings said Putin now 
"has a dangerous self-confidence", was "ruthless" and invited us to look inside the paper for 
more on "Putin's bloody record". Almost the same message warning us against "Putin's 
dangerous game" and "that we should fear the ruthless Putin" appeared on 10 and 24 March. 
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A slightly more ambiguous image, coded as between enemy and rival, appeared in Dagbladet 
29 March. The front page posited new NATO general secretary (and former Norwegian PM) 
Stoltenberg against a bare-chested Putin on horseback. The title now referred to "the new 
struggle for power" and demanded "Jens had to tame the ruthless Putin". 
 
VG's front pages were fewer and more ambiguous, seemingly more distanced from the 
conflict. They mostly framed the conflict as domestic, or rivalry between Russia and the West. 
There was little doubt about Russia as the aggressor towards Ukraine, but few signs that 
Russia represented a direct threat to Norway. The exception we coded as "enemy" appeared 
on the top of the front page on March 5. It shows an angry Norwegian Foreign minister 
Brende, who "lashes out against Putin" in an interview on the inside. On March 29, VG used 
an almost identical front page to the Stoltenberg vs. Putin front page in Dagbladet on the 
same day. However, we coded this as between "enemy" and "rival". VG added a larger close-
up of an angrier Stoltenberg opposite a smaller version of the Putin on horseback picture. 
Their message was "Yes! He (Stoltenberg) is tough enough" (to tame Putin). A small section 
of the front page about the Crimean referendum on 17 March fit into the "rival" image. It 
comprised a photo of Crimeans celebrating the victory (no quotes used) and a title that 
claimed this was a "victory dismissed by the West".  
 
While Aftenposten put the Ukraine conflict on their front pages almost daily, they took a 
slightly different approach. Like the others, they framed Russia as an aggressor acting outside 
of international law. But they focused more on ordinary civilians and combatants from both 
sides of the conflicts, and less on the Putin persona. Furthermore, readers were reminded of 
the conflict almost daily by small notices on the front page. The front page on 2 March  
conveyed a message of Russia as an enemy. Crimea was under occupation by Russian troops, 
unwelcomed by the local population. A photo showed masked soldiers watching worried 
civilians in the street. The accompanying title clarified that this represented "Cold war in the 
streets of Crimea". On March 16 a photo of Crimeans celebrating the referendum formed the 
backdrop for a title and comments that emphasised the voters had no real alternatives. 
However, there were no references to Russia as a direct threat to the West. This ambiguity 
contributed to a mixed image of Russia containing both elements of "enemy" and "rival". 
 
Rival images on Aftenposten's front pages of Aftenposten were less visible for readers, as they 
appeared as small items on the lower part of the pages. Both items referred to the Russian 
claims of Ukrainian fascism. The first appeared on 15 March and described "a new army set 
up to watch over the referendum" and its claim of necessary defence against "fascist 
aggression". On 28, March a small title referred to the controversial historical figure of Stepan 
Bandera. Bandera was "a hero for Ukrainians" and "Quisling for the Russians", because of his 
collaboration with Germany during WWII against the Soviet Union, to gain independence for 
Ukraine.  
 
Comments and articles 
As shown in table 2 below, the coverage of the conflict inside the newspapers was extensive 
and dominated by staff contributions. The difference between the newspapers was smaller 
than for front pages. On average, the two boulevard papers dedicated around two articles 
and pages daily to the conflict, while Aftenposten dedicated over three articles and pages. 
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Table 3. The Ukraine conflict in Aftenposten, VG and Dagbladet articles, March 2014 
 
 Newspaper Articles Pages 
Internal Aftenposten 96 87,15 
 VG 56 69,7 
 Dagbladet 52 63,35 
External Aftenposten 11 9,75 
 VG 13 5,95 
 Dagbladet 4 4,75 
Total Aftenposten 107 96,9 
 VG 69 75,65 
 Dagbladet 56 68,1 
 
We used the same method as for the front pages to analyse and code these items.  Figure 3 
below summarises the findings. Overall, the framing of Russia was hostile, but less than on 
the front pages. None of the articles fitted into the Kantian "friend" image. Most of the articles 
written by the newspaper staff identified Russia according to a hybrid image with elements 
of both "enemy" and "rival". Fewer articles identified Russia's identity as an unambiguous 
"enemy" than a "rival". The variation in terms of image was more significant among the 
external contributors. However, these contributions were few in numbers and comprised 
mostly shorter and less visible pieces.   
 
 
Figure 3.  Images of Russia in articles and comments in March 2014.  
(Absolute and relative frequency distribution. Percentages in brackets) 
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Like the front pages, we also treated the image of Russia as a continuous variable. Regarding 
internal contributions the arithmetical means varies little, from x=2.53 (Dagbladet) to x=2.60 
(VG), all overlapping with the median value ("rival to enemy"). The standard deviations at 
s=0.22 (VG), s=0.30 (Dagbladet) and s=0.32 (Aftenposten) confirm the readers were exposed 
to a limited range of images, especially in VG. The external contributions varied more, ranging 
from "hawkish" in Aftenposten and Dagbladet (x=2.75) to milder in VG (x=2.25). Standard 
deviations ranging from 0.57 in VG to 0.42 in Aftenposten and 0.29 in Dagbladet indicate a 
broader use of images in external than internal contributions in Aftenposten and VG.  
 
To illustrate the range of images, we shall comment upon a small selection of articles. In 
Aftenposten’s commentary on 4 March is an example of an "enemy" image (Dragnes, 2014). 
A large cartoon of a bare-chested Putin, armed and on horseback, assaulting Ukraine 
accompanied it. The text framed Putin and Russia as obsessed with power politics. While the 
commentary did not explicitly mention relations with Norway, it framed neighbouring Russia 
as a barbaric state, breaking international law and the principle of sovereignty at will.  
 
A more ambiguous image between "rival" and "enemy" appeared in an article from 17 March  
about the referendum on Crimea (Aale, 2014). The first impression, from the picture and 
headings introducing the piece, was of Russia as the defender of the Russian-speaking 
population. Voters commented positively about Crimea's strong ties and imminent accession 
with Russia. For them, this was a day to celebrate. However, this image was counter-balanced, 
as the article referred to the lack of transparency and the occupation by thousands of Russian 
troops.  
 
The "rival" image appeared in an Aftenposten article on 7 March (Claussen and Færaas, 2014). 
It focused on the right-wing nationalists in the new Ukrainian government and seems partially 
to support the Russian claims of defence against "fascists". The article emphasised that 
Western leaders did not want to talk about them. On the other hand, the article also 
mentioned that Russia was using this as an excuse for their intervention and showed similar 
fascist tendencies.  
 
Dagbladet's articles framed Russia through headlines and expressions that played on the 
emotions and prejudices of the reader. They also focused more on Putin's persona, as an 
emotionless dictator, eager to increase his power. This was visible in an article from 29 March  
entitled "Meeting a merciless Putin" (Strand and Hagvaag, 2014). Two large photos on the 
opposite sides of a two-page spread contrasted a warrior-like, bare-chested Putin on 
horseback with a worried looking new NATO general secretary Jens Stoltenberg out jogging. 
The text emphasised that NATO now faced a formidable challenge to its security from a 
changed Russia that had become a "pariah", outside international society. 
 
An article from 3 March used a headline which translates to "No prayers for mercy" in capital 
letters and a large photo that pitted Russian soldiers against civilians praying in front of a 
Ukrainian military base (Lillegaard and Strand, 2014). The article left little doubt about Russia 
as an enemy of Ukraine and their direct military intervention on Crimea. However, it also 
referred to the apparent chaos, the local militia's claims of defence against Ukrainian fascists, 
as well as the dramatically different perceptions of reality in the Eastern and Western parts 
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of Ukraine. Moreover, as there were no mentions of threats to Norway or the West, the article 
was therefore categorised as between "rival" and "enemy".  
 
Dagbladet had some articles that framed Russia through the rival image. On 14 March  an 
article entitled "The game for Ukraine" put the crisis into a historical context of strategic great 
power rivalry about control, and as a local Ukrainian rivalry (Skotheim, 2014). It used a major 
background graphic of the classic board game Monopoly, with a map of Ukraine at the centre 
of the board. Cards with photos and a short commentary identified several players, both 
Ukrainian and Western besides Putin. In the commentaries, all players “presented” their 
interests and views on the conflict. The Tatars, identified as the historic and present-day 
victim seemed to be the only player who got any sympathy.   
 
VG also emphasised sensational headlines and used Putin's persona, to frame him as the 
villain through cartoons and text. A large cartoon depicting a Putin dressed as a biathlon 
competitor aiming his rifle against another competitor headed its editorial on 4 March  (VG, 
2014). The latter competitor represented Putin as the host of the recent Winter Olympics. 
The title "Putin's dangerous game" also played on how he had transformed from the Winter 
Games to the war games in Ukraine. According to the editorial Putin now was a serious threat 
to world peace. It also drew historic parallels to the Cold War, connecting the Olympics 
(Moscow 1980) and the Soviet Union invading another country (Afghanistan 1979/80). 
 
The ambiguity between the enemy image and the rival image was visible in an article from 6 
March  (Skjærli, 2014). Focusing on a "Family on the Crimea", it apparently suggested that 
Russia was merely protecting the security of the local population. The family feared that the 
riots and unrest in Kiev would spread and was grateful for the Russian presence. Hence, the 
article's main heading "Now we feel safe". It identified the family as Russian speakers and the 
conflict as local. However, the ambiguity became highly visible as VG put the referrals to "look 
after" in quotes, and commented through a graphic that compared the superior Russian 
military strength with Ukraine.   
 
An article from 7 March  entitled "The cockfight", focusing on the strained personal relations 
between Putin and Obama, was close to the rival image (Amundsen, 2014). The title was 
positioned on top of a large photo of the two presidents sitting opposite each other. Both 
were apparently attempting to make the other blink first. Putin and Obama’s opposite 
viewpoints were referred to and commented, but without attributing singular blame to one 
of them. 
Discussion 
Research question 1 asked which Wendtian images the news media used to frame Russia. We 
found that the three Norwegian newspapers most frequently used a hybrid of the enemy and 
rival image. In the Russia - Ukraine dyad, the former undoubtedly represented the enemy of 
the latter. But in the dyadic relation between Russia and Norway, the newspapers mostly 
abstained from applying a full enemy image, which constructed Russia as a direct threat to 
Norwegian security and sovereignty. The full enemy image was more frequent on front-pages 
than in the articles inside, which allowed for more nuanced framing. However, even while 
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Russia’s intervention in Ukraine sometimes was framed as engaging in international rivalry, it 
was never found to be acceptable within international law.  
 
The Ukraine crisis appears as a critical juncture in the post-Cold War era. During the 2000s 
Russia was gradually reasserting its position, as a rival to alleged US and Western dominance 
of the international order. Still, Western states expected that Russia would stick to the rules 
of international law, despite some temporary deviations. Judging from the newspaper 
narratives of the intervention into Ukraine, they now rendered this assumption invalid. It 
represented a reversal of the "qualitative structural change in international politics" 
hypothesised by Wendt: "The kill or be killed logic of the Hobbesian state of nature has been 
replaced by the live and let live logic of the Lockean anarchical society" (Wendt, 1999: 279). 
 
This leads us over to the second research question, which asked whether the Norwegian mass 
media "arrested the war". If Russia had any influence, we would expect the representation to 
be far from the "enemy" image. The Russian strategic narrative framed the West and the US 
in particular, as the real enemy of Ukraine. Russian actions in Ukraine were as a "friend", 
intervening to protect a helpless population. Ukraine had become the scene for a rivalry with 
an aggressive West forcing Russia to defend its legitimate interests. Political leaders in 
Norway dismissed this narrative.  
 
As suggested in the presentation of RQ 2 earlier, a negative correlation between the Russian 
narrative and the narratives in Norwegian news is necessary to falsify a hypothesis about 
Russian influence.  We found few examples of narratives defending Russia's actions in the 
three mainstream newspapers. They all appeared to be aware of alleged Russian propaganda 
and disinformation and debunked many of the stories reported by RT International as “lies 
and hoaxes” (Johansen, 2014a, 2014b, 2014c). This shows that Russia was unsuccessful in its 
deployment of "sharp power", as foreign minister Brende had worried about. Our data 
support the "arrested war"-thesis. The Kremlin narrative of Putin and RT International did not 
form a successful cross-national "cascade" into the Norwegian news coverage. The news 
coverage corresponded more with the official narratives of President Obama and the 
Norwegian government's narrative. It framed Russia as the illegitimate aggressor against 
Ukraine. While it sometimes referred to the Russian side of the conflict, this was not a 
consequence of Russian "sharp power". Protests against alleged "big media bias" and more 
sympathetic views on Russia were mostly limited to niche newspapers and websites. 
 
Our second research question was extended to ask whether the mass media also "arrested 
the war", in the sense of acting independently of the Norwegian government and its most 
important ally the United States. The newspaper narrative was slightly more nuanced than 
that of President Obama and Foreign Minister Brende, at times attributing some blame to the 
West and Ukrainian nationalism. However, there was no significant criticism of the policies of 
the Norwegian government and its NATO and EU partners towards Russia. Given the inter-
party consensus apparent from the subsequent Parliamentary debate after Brende's speech, 
there was probably little room for public criticism. As observed for the USA by Entman, 
political polarisation and absence of consensus make criticism in the media more likely 
(Entman, 2003: 422). 
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Norms of "peace journalism" were clearly not applied. But does this mean that patriotic 
"fourth branch of government" norms prevailed over professional "fourth estate of 
government" norms? The news media were confronted with a sudden international crisis 
reminiscent of the Cold War, as well as an information war with extreme difficulties as to the 
motives and credibility of Russian and Ukrainian sources. Under such circumstances 
Norwegian journalists may have had an inherent bias, being close to more trusted sources 
like NATO, as observed by the General Secretary of the Norwegian Press (Alexandersen, 
2016). Furthermore, with a political elite consolidated against Russia as the aggressor, we find 
it reasonable to consider the news narrative as reflecting patriotic norms. 
 
As indicated earlier in the paper, we have some brief comments on the effects on the public 
perception of Russia. This represents the third tier in the model presented in Figure 1. 
National and cross-national cascades of strategic narratives. From 2011 to 2018, 85-94% of 
the respondents to the annual opinion poll of Norwegian defence and security reported they 
got most of their information on security and defence from the media (Forsvaret, 2018). 
While we have no data on direct media effects, the same poll (see figure 4 below) also 
revealed that a growing share of the respondents was “a little, somewhat or very worried of 
war or attacks on Norwegian territory” after the Ukraine crisis (Forsvaret, 2018). Other polls 
also indicate a rising fear of Russia among Norwegians. In 2018 57% of the respondents 
regarded Russia as a significant “threat to world peace”, up from 45% in 2016 (Eriksen, 2018; 
Finsveen, 2016). 
 
 
 
Figure 4. Public opinion on threats of war or attacks on Norwegian territory (%) 
Source: Forsvaret, 2018 
Accepted version of paper by Bjørge & Kalnes published in Media, War & Conflict Online First 2019. 
DOI: 10.1177/1750635219864024 
 
 
20 
 
Conclusion and further research 
This paper has investigated how the Norwegian news media framed Russia during its 
intervention in Ukraine and the Crimea. The data represents a snapshot, limited to a single 
month and to the print versions of three Norwegian mainstream newspapers. It shows that 
all newspapers, especially Aftenposten, dedicated considerable resources and space to the 
conflict. The newspapers framed Russia as the enemy of Ukraine, although they mostly 
abstained from applying the full enemy image of Russia in its relationship with Norway. The 
analysis indicated that the mainstream media had "arrested” the conflict in Ukraine. But also 
that the press mostly followed “patriotic norms” and avoided criticism of the government.  
 
Therefore, our evidence indicates that when 1) national security appears to be at stake, 2) 
information about facts on the ground is confusing and difficult to verify and 3) the political 
elites agree, 4) the mass media is likely to trust and support the strategic narratives of their 
own government and its closest allies. However, our empirical material is limited to articles 
and front pages. It says little about the actual processes behind producing them. Further 
studies of similar conflicts should therefore include empirical data about the news production 
process, and how journalists and editors perceive their roles in the process. Neither does our 
study include data on direct audience effects from the framing of Russia. This should be 
followed up in forthcoming studies. Finally, we focused on the mainstream news media’s 
representation during a short period marked by surprise, confusion and little transparency. 
Further research should investigate how the initial frames persist or change during the course 
of international crises.    
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